Abstract. This paper revisits a particular behaviour for …rms competing in imperfect competitive markets, underlying the well known model of kinked demand curve. We show that under some symmetry and regularity conditions, this asymmetric behaviour of …rms sustains monopoly pricing, and possesses therefore some "rationality" interpretation. We also show that such a behaviour can be generalized and interpreted as a norm of behaviour that sustains e¢ cient outcomes in a more general class of symmetric games.
Introduction
This paper focusses on the postulated behaviour of …rms competing in imperfect competitive markets, …rstly theorized in the late 30s by a number of well known economists (Robinson (1933) , Sweezy (1939) ), and best known as the "kinked demand model". This basically predicts an asymmetric behaviour of …rms in response to a price change, each expecting its rivals to be more reactive in matching its price cuts than its price increases. This prediction has been empirically tested by Hall and Hitch (1939) and later by Bhaskar et al. (1991) , extensively criticized as not grounded in rational behaviour by Stigler (1947) , Domberger (1979) , Reid (1981) and more recently extended to dynamic settings by Marschak and Selten (1978) , Bhaskar (1988) , Anderson (1984) , Maskin and Tirole (1988) , among the others.
In this paper we add to this debate by showing that this behavioural rule possesses strong stability properties and, therefore, facilitates …rms' collusion. In particular, in a symmetric and monotone market, we prove that, if every …rm adopts and expects a simple kinked-demand norm of behaviour We wish to thank Gani Aldashev, Tom Kirchmaier, Jorn Rothe and all participants to seminars and conference at the Mangement Department, LSE, University of Venice and University of Urbino.
(KD), the symmetric strategy pro…le sustaining the collusive outcome (i.e. monopoly pricing) constitutes an equilibrium. We show that this result is rather robust and can be extended to all n-person symmetric strategic form games: a KD norm of behaviour always makes the symmetric e¢ cient strategy pro…le (the one maximizing the sum of all players'utility) stable. Moreover, we show that under some additional standard assumptions on players'playo¤ functions, a slightly stronger norm of behaviour (implicitly implying a norm of reciprocity) makes the e¢ cient outcome the only stable outcome of the game.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sketches the paper idea in a classical two-…rm kinked demand model. Section 2 introduces a more general game-theoretic setting. Section 3 presents the main paper results. Section 4 concludes.
The Kinked Demand Model
The original idea of the kinked demand model (Robinson 1936 , Sweezy 1939 ) is based on the assumption that …rms competing in a common market would react to changes in rivals' prices in an asymmetric manner. Specifically, when a …rm rises its price it expects the other …rms to rise their price comparatively less (under-reaction); when a …rm lowers its price, conversely, it expects the others to reduce even more their price (over-reaction). This expected behaviour generates a perceived demand with a "kink" at the original price levels (see …gure 1).
Figure 1
The main insight of this note can be illustrated by means of a simple case of two …rms competing in prices in a common imperfectly competitive market with di¤erentiated goods Suppose prices are set at collusive levels (p 1 ; p 2 ), i.e., in order to maximize the sum of …rms' pro…ts. The kinked demand model assumes that the following behaviour (here expressed as a reaction function k i (p j ) for every i = 1; 2, j 6 = i), would prevail in case of deviation from collusive pricing:
Note that no presumption of best response (rationality) is assumed for k j (:).
The main point of this paper is that if …rms adopt and expect the above behavior, then deviation from collusive prices (p 1 ; p 2 ) are prevented, and collusion is a stable outcome. To see this, suppose one …rm, say …rm 1, decides to deviate from the pair of strategies (p 1 ; p 2 ) to improve upon its pro…t, that is,
It is well known that under price competition the e¤ect of a rise in competitors'prices yields a positive e¤ect on every …rm's pro…t, i.e.
it must be that 
contradicting the e¢ ciency (for the …rms) of the perfectly collusive outcome. The same result obviously holds when it is …rm 2 to deviate. This implies that if all …rms expect a kinked demand response from all other …rms, no pro…table deviations are possible from the perfectly collusive outcome (monopoly pricing). Interestingly, the result extends to the case in which the …rms set quantities instead of prices. The 'kinked demand' behavior now dictates the following (for every i = 1; 2, j 6 = i and every feasible quantity):
where q 0 i indicates any feasible quantity di¤erent from q i , and k j (q 0 i ) the quantity set in response by its rival. Again, it is well known that under quantity competition the e¤ect of a rise in the competitor's quantity yields a negative e¤ect on every …rm's pro…t (negative spillovers), that is,
since it lowers the market price p (q 1 ; q 2 ). Hence, if …rm 1 pro…tably deviates from the pair of strategies (q 1 ; q 2 ) and
Since, by symmetry, 1 q
which, again, contradicts the e¢ ciency of the pair of strategies (q 1 ; q 2 ). In the next section we show that such a result holds in the general class of symmetric strategic games.
A More General Setting
The result sketched above does not rely on the speci…c structure of imperfect competition, but only on the asymmetry of the assumed reaction to changes in players strategies, and on some built-in symmetry. The aim of this section is therefore to give a precise statement of the result in a larger class of games that still preserves the required symmetry and monotonicity.
In this class of games players are endowed with the same strategy space and perceive symmetrically all strategy pro…les of the game. Moreover, players'payo¤s possess a monotonicity property with respect to their opponents'choices. Although speci…c, this setting still covers many well known economic applications (as Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, public goods games and many others).
We refer to a monotone symmetric n-player game in strategic form as a triple G = N; (X i ; u i ) i2N , in which N = f1; :::; i; :::; ng is the …nite set of players, X i is player i's strategy set and u i : X 1 ::: X n ! R + is player i's payo¤ function. We assume that each strategy set is partially ordered by the relation . We assume the following.
P.1 (Symmetry) X i = X for each i 2 N . Moreover, for every i 2 N and any arrangement of the strategy indexes,
:; x n ) = ::: = u n (x n ; x 2 ; ::; x 1 ):
P.2 (Monotone Spillovers) For every i; j 2 N with j 6 = i, and every x 1 j x j x 2 j we have either "positive spillovers" (PS)
; where x j = (x 1 ; :::; x j 1 ; x j+1 ; ::; x n ):
A strategy pro…le x is symmetric if it prescribes the same strategy to all players. A Pareto Optimum (PO) for G is a strategy pro…le x o such that there exists no alternative pro…le which is preferred by all players and is strictly preferred by at least one player. A Pareto E¢ cient (PE) pro…le is a pro…le x e that maximizes the sum of payo¤s of all players in N .
Let us now introduce the notion of a generic social norm of behaviour in our setting.
We are interested in the family of Kinked Social Norm (KSN) of behaviour (KSN), de…ned as follows: 
under positive spillovers(PS) and
under negative spillovers(NS).
Note that, according to the de…nition above, every KSN imposes to all agents in N n fig to play a strategy lower (greater) or equal than the strategy played by the deviating player i under positive (negative) spillovers. Pictures 2 and 3 below represent graphically the KSN in the two-player case under either positive (…gure 2) and negative spillovers (…gure 3). In both pictures, the darker (brighter) area represents the KSN for player 1 (player 2) under either positive or negative spillovers. The pair (x e 1 ; x e 2 ) represents the symmetric PE strategy pro…les in the two cases. 1 The emergence of norms of behaviour can be viewed as arising from the evolution of Note that behind the KSN of behaviour there is no presumption of rational behaviour and players'reactions may not correspond to their best reply mappings (see below for a brief digression on this point).
We are now ready to present the main results of the paper. Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 simply tells us that if the expected behaviour of players in the event of a deviation from an e¢ cient strategy pro…le is described by the kinked social norm, then every such e¢ cient pro…le, if reached, is stable. In terms of imperfect competition, the expected kinked behaviour of …rms makes collusion a stable outcome.
The example below makes clear that stable ine¢ cient (and asymmetric) outcomes cannot be ruled out without adding more structure to the above analysis. In this game we assume that players' strategy can be ordered and, e.g., A B C, therefore the game respects both P.1 and P.2, with positive spillovers (PS). In this game, (A; A) ; the PE strategy pro…le, is obviously stable under any KSN. If, say player 1 deviates playing B, KSN implies k 2 (B) = fB; Cg and player 1 ends up with a lower payo¤ than before, since u 1 (A; A) > u 1 (B; B) > u 1 (B; C). By symmetry, the same happens to player 2. However, also ine¢ cient strategy pro…les can be stable under a KSN rule. For instance (B; B) i stable if the KSN active in the game prescribes that players react with C to any feasible deviation. Also, it can be checked that (A; B), (C; A) and (A; C) are also stable under any KSN, given that u 1 (B; A) > u 1 (A; B) > u 1 (A; C) and u 1 (C; A) > u 1 (B; B) > u 1 (B; C) and the same for player 2.
To strengthen the result of proposition 1 and rule out ine¢ cient stable outcomes, we add the following assumptions on the structure of G.
P3. Each player's strategy set is a compact and convex subset of the set of real numbers.
P4. Each player i's payo¤ function u i (x) is continuous in x and strictly quasiconcave in x i .
Under these additional conditions, Lemma 1 in the appendix shows that there is a unique Pareto E¢ cient strategy pro…le of G, and it is symmetric. In order to rule out all ine¢ cient stable outcomes, we need to re…ne the social norm employed in proposition 1. Intuitively, the kinked norm imposes an upper bound on the pro…tability of deviations, and was therefore useful to show that e¢ cient pro…les are stable. In order to rule out the stability of ine¢ cient pro…les, we need to impose a lower bound on the pro…tability of deviations. We do so by imposing a "symmetric" social norm of behaviour, which essentially prescribes players to mimic the strategy adopted by a deviator.
Definition 4. (Symmetric Social Norm) The Symmetric Social Norm (SSN) s is described as follows for each i 2 N , and x 0 i :
We are now ready to prove the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Let the game G satisfy conditions P1-P4. Then, under the Symmetric Social Norm of Behaviour the (symmetric) Pareto e¢ cient pro…le x e 2 X N is the unique stable strategy pro…le.
Proof. See Appendix.
Finally, a relevant question to raise is whether the behaviour predicted by the model of kinked demand can in general be considered rational. About this issue, it has been proved for other purposes (see Currarini & Marini (2004) ), that in all symmetric supermodular games in which strategy sets are ordered, in the event of any coalitional deviation from the e¢ cient symmetric outcome, remaining players always play a lower strategy (under PS) or a greater strategy (under NS) than every deviating coalition. This proves that the behaviour postulated by the kinked demand model is in principle fully compatible with players'rationality whenever their actions are strategic complements (see, for instance, Bulow et al. (1985) ) and players' best response are positively sloped. The same cannot be said when games are submodular, i.e. players' actions are strategic substitutes, and their best response are negatively sloped.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that, in all symmetric and monotone strategic form games, the behaviour postulated by the classical model of kinked demand possesses strong stability properties. Such a result holds even stronger when players expect a symmetric behaviour from all remaining players in the event of a deviation. In this case, the perfectly cooperative (collusive) outcome becomes the only stable outcome of the game. 
and therefore, by P1,
which contradicts the e¢ ciency of x e . Assume now that under negative spillovers (NS) there exists a player i 2 N with a x 0 i 2 X i such that
By NS and the fact that
which, again, leads to a contradiction. LEMMA 1. Let the game G satisfy conditions P1-P4. Then, there is a unique strategy pro…le x e = arg max x2X N P i2N u i (x) and it is such that, x e 1 = x e 2 = ::: = x e n .
Proof. Compactness of each X i implies compactness of X N : Continuity of each player's payo¤ u i (x) on x implies the continuity of the social payo¤ function u N = P i2N u i (x). Existence of an e¢ cient pro…le (PE) x e 2 X N directly follows from Weiestrass theorem.We …rst prove that a PE strategy pro…le is symmetric.
Suppose x e i 6 = x e j for some i; j 2 N: By symmetry we can derive from x e a new vector x 0 by permuting the strategies of players i and j such that
and hence, by the strict quasiconcavity of all u i (x); for all 2 (0; 1) we have that:
Since, by the convexity of X; the strategy vector ( x 0 + (1 )x e ) 2 X N ; we obtain a contradiction. Finally, by the strict quasiconcavity of both individual and social payo¤s in each player's strategy, the e¢ cient pro…le x e can be easily proved to be unique. which contradicts the e¢ ciency of x e . We next show that all ine¢ cient pro…les are not stable. The argument for ine¢ cient symmetric pro…les is trivial: thanks to the Symmetric Social Norm (SSN) , it is enough for any player i to switch to the e¢ cient pro…le to improve upon any ine¢ cient strategy pro…le. Consider then an asymmetric pro…le x 0 . Let i be one player such that u i (x 0 ) < u i (x e ) (obviously, such a player must exist by e¢ ciency of x e and ine¢ ciency of x 0 ). By continuity of payo¤s, there exists some strategy x i close enough to x e i such that u i (x e ) u i ( x i ; :::; x i ) < u i (x e ) u i (x 0 ):
Since the pro…le ( x i ; :::; x i ) can be induced by player i thanks to SSN, player i has a pro…table deviation, and the result follows.
